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Abstract
In recent years, many scholars, mainly those focusing on populism, have analysed 
the role of ‘the people’ in politics. This has allowed us to understand how many 
political actors emphasize the central position of this term. Today, ‘the people’ has 
different meanings depending on how politicians use it in specific contexts. In this 
paper, the reference to ‘the people’ was measured using the following question: How 
do political leaders use the word ‘people’? The analysis was conducted on Twitter 
through the study of the accounts of the foremost political leaders in the UK during 
the 2019 general election campaign. The results highlight three key attitudes related 
to the use of ‘people’: a direct and immediate relationship between a leader and a 
wide people; a calling to a specific people, described as a strong and cohesive group; 
an appropriation of the voice of the people, grouping people without borders into 
the classic contraposition between a pure people and the corrupt elite.
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Introduction
Populism is an ideology focused on recognising ‘the people’ as the overriding sub‑
ject of politics. This special status has allowed for an understanding of how political 
actors have emphasized the people’s central position in politics (Ionescu and Gell‑
ner 1969; Mény and Surel 2002; Taggart 2000; de la Torre 2010). Populism studies 
regard the ‘ordinary’ people as representing a pure, monolithic, and homogeneous 
group with a positive valorization in an antagonistic relationship against an ‘elite’ 
(Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004). In this context, by expressing the general will of the 
people, the primary purpose of populist figures is to give more power back to the 
people, who are then able to determine their destiny.
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However, the idea of ‘the people’ is inevitably bonded by both its ‘rhetorical use‑
fulness’ and its ‘conceptual obscurity’ (Canovan 2005). Indeed, from a populist per‑
spective the adversarial relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ develops 
a simplistic rhetoric where the existence of a people presupposes the existence of 
an elite. On the other side, the ambiguity of the ‘people’ concept has hindered the 
development of populism as a coherent ideology (Stanley 2008).
Populism appears in a thin‑centred form (Taggart 2000; Stanley 2008; Mudde 
2004). This means that it needs other ideologies to be understood, or, as regards 
Western Europe, categorized (Pauwels 2014). It has a chameleonic nature able to 
adopt the hue of its environment (Taggart 2000).
Other scholars highlight instead the parasitic nature of populism as able to attack 
the most important ‘host’, representative democracy, defying it for its exclusive rep‑
resentation of the people (Urbinati 1998). Indeed, often bypassing parliamentary 
politics, for example, populists appeal directly to the people (Mudde and Kaltwasser 
2012). However, although populism, as parasitic, feeds on the democratic host, this 
relationship causes a dependence able to give to populism a transformative demo‑
cratic potential (Canovan 1981).
Looking at the symbiotic relationship between parasite and host, populism and 
democracy, in nature some parasites destroy their host, but most do not. It is clear 
why. If populism destroys its host, it is also likely to disappear. Instead, parasites 
normally generate relatively minor damage in their host. Moreover, although pop‑
ulism is often described by ‘parasitism’ theorists as a negative relationship, other 
symbiotic relationships have by their nature neutral or positive effects. In some 
cases, one subject benefits while the other is not affected, as with what biologists 
call ‘commensalism’; in other cases, the symbiotic relationship benefits both sub‑
jects, as in ‘mutualism’.
In this way, populism can be seen as a thin ideology often associated with more 
traditional ideologies in a symbiotic relationship where, after an initial negative 
effect on the host, it is possible to have neutral or even positive mutual effects. Its 
thinness allows us to analyse it as a complementary ideology that does not overlap 
other full ideologies but develops alongside them (Stanley 2008). Using this per‑
spective, the ambiguity/obscurity of the key core concept for populism, ‘the people’, 
does not help to clarify its relationships, its transformations or even itself. For this 
reason, this paper focuses on the concept of ‘the people’ to better understand its 
role in (and outside) the ideological thinness. What sets the ‘people’ idea apart from 
similar ideas, such as class or nation, is indeed its role as a signifier. Laclau argues 
that ‘the people’ (and consequently also the elite) is a term with ‘empty signifiers’ 
(Laclau 2005), which only gains a specific connotation when it is properly contex‑
tualized. In other words, it is the adjective that politicizes the noun (Badiou et al. 
2013) by giving it a collective role, a specific identification, or the nature of legiti‑
macy in a political system (e.g. as a sovereign people).
Thus, while the signifier is certainly very flexible, other scholars describing pop‑
ulism in an ideological approach consider it as not totally empty. For example, the 
moral opposition of ‘pure’ people vs ‘corrupt’ elite presupposes a cultural view 
which gives the signifier a specific content (Mudde 2004); or the use by populists 
of contents based on the self‑perception of features of target communities allows 
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the elevation of the concept of ‘people’ to shared ideals (Taggart 2004); or follow‑
ing full ideologies by adding other meanings to people purity (Canovan 2005); or 
describing it using other categories, such as class in ‘social populism’ (March 2012) 
and nation in ‘national populism’ (Taguieff 1995).
From these perspectives, although ‘the people’ is not just a concept of the pop‑
ulism theories, this paper aims to focus on its thinness and complementarity, ana‑
lysing the ‘people’ concept as not completely empty, and looking at its different 
contents depending on how leaders use it in certain circumstances. The term ‘the 
people’ is, therefore, better understood by observing the context or the values of the 
targeted community. For this reason, the concept is the undisputed star in the fol‑
lowing research questions: How do political leaders use the word ‘people’? What 
content does the signifier of ‘the people’ assume?
In order to understand this, an analysis of party leaders on Twitter was conducted 
from 12 October to 16 December 2019, covering the 2019 UK electoral campaign. 
The tweet analysis focused solely on the use of the word ‘people’ by five leaders, 
excluding non‑specific references, e.g. ‘citizens’, ‘we’, ‘our country’, or ‘the soci‑
ety’. The choice to analyse only the word ‘people’ is due to the need to understand 
the role of ‘the people’ by focusing on its original meaning and differences.
Populism, populists, and peoples: who and what is ‘the people’ today, 
and why study it?
In populism studies, the term ‘people’ hides an underlying ambiguity, with several 
core meanings (Mény and Surel 2002). Indeed, ‘people’ can refer simultaneously 
to both the whole and the part. It may also apply, in relation to a heartland (Taggart 
2000), to those individuals with a particular nationality, or a part of it, which tries 
to establish itself as a community based on cultural and/or political features. These 
essential meanings often intertwine. At other times, they change according to the 
historical context or different political strategies.
There is a blurring of this polysemic term, ‘the people’, because the main ide‑
ological reference influences different realities in contemporary politics. Indeed, 
while the classic democratic approach refers to ‘the people’ in an abstract manner, 
the populist one adds other specificities, perceiving it as a community of race, cul‑
ture, identity, blood, and so forth. Indeed, populists appealing to the ‘people’ attempt 
to build a homogeneous and undifferentiated group able to exclude ‘others’ automat‑
ically: individuals not belonging to this constructed community. Another problem 
occurs when the concept is transferred from one country to another, or from a local/
national system to a different context. For example, in Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East, populism defines the people based on ethnicity and religion, integrating differ‑
ent individuals—landowners, merchants, bureaucrats, clergy, armed forces (Di Tella 
1997).
‘The people’ may refer to a particular social class, which, although they seem to 
represent opposite poles in different national societies, have a similar social exist‑
ence in certain respects. For example, Peronism in Latin America has constructed 
the people around the working class; in Russia, there are the peasants; and in France, 
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the suburban petty bourgeoisie (Mudde and Kaltwasser ). Changes in recent years, 
due above all to the economic crisis, drove right‑wing populism towards the social 
class dimension, such as the working class in Austria and Switzerland, or the Lepin‑
ism of the Front National in France (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Thus, the key mean‑
ing of the term ‘people’ changes according to the political, historical, and social 
context, making the people–populism connection difficult and blurred. Indeed, some 
scholars explain that the term ‘people’ should not be used to define the populism 
concept due to its ambiguity, suggesting instead the reference to a heartland, a retro‑
spective construction of an ideal community (Taggart 2004).
The category of ‘the people’ now has at least three core meanings: (1) a unified 
entity with legitimate power in whose name laws are produced and implemented; 
(2) the social body that shares the same territory in a specific historical period; and 
(3) the socio‑political group that claims and achieves political power through move‑
ments, parties, and their representatives (Urbinati 2019).
In the first meaning, ‘the people’ is used in a formal way to legitimize legal rule, 
which is impartial and fair. Thus, the term ‘the people’ reaches the highest inclu‑
siveness level, inasmuch as it includes all the individuals of the same state, which 
become the ground of its authority (Espejo 2011). Since the first medieval enforc‑
ing of Roman Law, the people’s central role has become ‘sovereign’ in the mod‑
ern theories of representation and ‘constitutionalized’ between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries through the first constitutions made in their name, as the most 
crucial source of authority in the state (Espejo 2017).
In the second meaning, ‘the people’ is a sociological category treated as an ethi‑
cal entity, and an ideological tool often used to justify protection from ‘others’, both 
external and internal enemies (Urbinati 2019). In this case, the people become a 
portfolio of populations held together by the nation. Indeed, ‘the people’ is used as 
artificial unity to stabilize a political order (Espejo 2017). In this way, the people 
have a symbolic reference, often associated with ethnicity or an ethnic group (Smith 
2003).
In the third meaning, ‘the people’ is indeterminate and characterized by a collec‑
tive function in the name of which movements and political parties claim to speak 
for ‘the people’. Through a political competition, where it is claimed that majority 
interests are prioritized against minorities, political movements organize themselves 
to claim their rights or to redress wrongs done to those they represent (Espejo 2017; 
Urbinati 2019).
Populism is mainly present in the last two core meanings. Indeed, the majori‑
tarian rule becomes necessary to the populist perspective as a means by which the 
‘general will’ can be achieved (Canovan 2005; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). In this 
view, the people are perceived as one body with distinctly defined boundaries, chal‑
lenging to cross. A distinction between those who belong to this group and those not 
included is necessary in the ideological framework. As to the nature of these bound‑
aries, popular sovereignty implies two kinds. The first relies on a view of the people 
as a legitimate sovereign. In this case, the people are directly opposed to the elites, 
which illegitimately use power in the name of the people. The second also presup‑
poses a territorial definition, reinforcing an identity narrowed down to the nation 
(Canovan 2005).
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The people become a ‘homogenous’ (Mudde 2004) or ‘monolithic’ (Taggart 
2000) group without internal differences (Jagers and Walgrave 2007), composed of 
‘common men’, ordinary people. This view is also reflected in Taggart’s concep‑
tualization of the heartland (2000, 2004), a place that, unlike utopian conceptions, 
is idealized around an imagined version of the past as that which has been lost in 
order to imagine a political vision blurred around the boundaries. This ambiguity is 
used by populist leaders who appeal to the people to support their views and legiti‑
mize their role. However, political leaders appeal to the people in different ways, 
and the high level of unity of the people does not necessarily correspond to a similar 
approach by politicians; it is necessary to understand and analyse this. Thus, the 
heartland can mean a number of considerably different things to different politicians. 
As Mudde (2004) notes, for the British National Party, the heartland was composed 
of ‘the native British people’, a group with precise and specific boundaries that dif‑
fers from both Taggart’s definition of heartland and Jagers and Walgrave’s approach 
to the role of ‘the people’.
To sum up, populism needs the notion of ‘the people’ in at least four aspects. 
First, the populist approach is people‑centred (Rooduijn 2014), in order to declare 
the supremacy of the people themselves (Mény and Surel 2002), i.e. popular sov‑
ereignty, and claim the ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’ 
(Canovan 1999, p. 10). Second, populism uses the people in an antagonistic way, 
making a permanent opposition between ‘the right people’, the ‘good’, and ‘the 
wrong people’, corrupt and ‘bad’ (Mudde 2004). Third, democratic legitimacy is 
related to the interests of the collective, the many, in opposition to the interests of 
the establishment, the few, in order to change the status quo (Urbinati 2019). Fourth, 
the populist movement or party claims to interpret the ‘general will’ of the people, 
representing the real idea of the people inasmuch as it is able to understand their will 
(Mudde 2004).
Following this key core of ‘the people’ in populism theories, this article aims to 
analyse, through the appeal to the people by the leader, the effective role of the peo‑
ple, how it is employed and what it is used to refer to.
Methods and data
This study aims to describe how ‘the people’ are identified by each leader during the 
electoral campaign, paying attention to the criteria according to which some people 
could be part of a specific group and other people left out. According to the litera‑
ture above, this article aims to respond to the following research questions: How do 
political leaders use the word ‘people’? What content does the signifier of ‘the peo‑
ple’ assume? Is it possible to identify associations between the term ‘people’ and the 
foremost political leaders in the UK? How do these associations impact the way in 
which the people are appealed to and idealized?
The analysis was conducted from 12 October to 16 December 2019 on Twitter 
through the study of the five main political leaders—Boris Johnson, Jeremy Cor‑
byn, Jo Swinson, Nicola Sturgeon, and Nigel Farage—during the 2019 UK electoral 
campaign.
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The decision to select the UK as a case study is best understood in the light of 
the transformations facing Europe after the Brexit referendum. Furthermore, the 
UK in the Brexit context has shown even more the thin‑centredness of populism as 
an ideology (Freeden 2017). Moreover, in recent years, several scholars have high‑
lighted the UK as a location where populisms, both left and right, strongly overlap 
with their underlying ideology (March 2017). Although in the past analyses claimed 
that the programmes of mainstream parties had not become more populist (Rooduijn 
et al. 2014), in recent years even established parties have experimented with pop‑
ulism. In the case of Labour, with Corbyn the claim was made that the party moved 
more to the left and followed political approaches that can be classified as close to 
populism (Watts and Bale 2019).
Within this scenario, the UK displays several elements of interest. In July 2019, 
after Theresa May’s resignation, Boris Johnson was selected as the Conservative 
leader and named Prime Minister. In this new context, Johnson failing to approve a 
revised withdrawal deal by the end of October led to a snap election on 12 Decem‑
ber 2019. Thus, the 2019 election represented one of the highest moments of politi‑
cal conflict in the UK. Given that the exit date from the European Union was set for 
the end of January 2020, Johnson needed to gain a clear majority in order to achieve 
his withdrawal deal.
Although the electoral campaign started in the first week of November, the period 
from 12 October to 16 December allows analysis of the time between two months 
before and the week after the UK elections. In this respect, three further aspects 
should be considered.
First, political communication has become a key factor in the vision and perfor‑
mance of populist movements and leaders. In this media context, the leader’s ability 
to communicate their messages has reached new levels, due also to the erosion of 
the monopoly that mainstream media and traditional political actors had held over 
this aspect. Moreover, social network platforms such as Twitter have provided politi‑
cal leaders with an opportunity to act in an unmediated way (Klinger and Svensson 
2015), speedily and virally (Jacobs and Spierings 2016, pp. 21–22), and directly 
involving the people (Klinger and Svensson 2015; Tromble 2016), through short, 
straightforward communication (Engesser et al. 2017) using everyday language (Bos 
and Brants 2014). This allows the creation of a grouping of followers in the lead‑
ers’ likeness, to which the party communicates or gives attention, embodying it and 
becoming their voice.
Second, during electoral campaigns successful appeals to the people are indispen‑
sable for high electoral performance so can be more frequent and sustained. Third, 
the 2019 electoral campaign focused on the relationship with the European Union. 
This aspect is relevant to this research. Indeed, many scholars have highlighted that 
EU institutions are often the main targets of the member states’ blame‑shifting strat‑
egies, becoming an ideal ‘issue’ on which anti‑establishment positions can increase. 
Euroscepticism has often become an anti‑elite topic for populists, and one of the 
most meaningful symbols of ‘populist potential’ (Taggart 2004; Van Kessel 2015).
In terms of data, the full content of the tweets of the five leaders in which the 
word ‘people’ appeared was analysed via Nvivo software. A total of 1,929 tweets 
were identified and collected, of which 226 contained the word ‘people’. Per each 
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unit of analysis, in addition to the unit’s identification items (date, username, text 
length, number of retweets, hashtag, mentions), four key variables were coded: the 
unit’s primary topic and central issue, the communicative strategy, and the people 
adjective.
The primary topic identifies the main topic upon which the unit is centred (e.g. 
campaign issues, policy issues, political issues, and current affairs) while the unit’s 
central issue identifies the problem covered by the tweets (e.g. education, elections, 
foreign policy, etc.), which become the two first most important things in analys‑
ing the tweet’s content (Ausserhofer and Maireder 2013; Conway et al. 2015; Davis 
et al. 2016).
The communicative strategy identifies the communication technique imple‑
mented, e.g. emotional (Bos et al. 2011, 2013; Mazzoleni et al. 2003; Van Santen 
and Van Zoonen 2010), instrumental (Krämer 2014), intimate (Stanyer 2012), sim‑
plification (Alvares and Dahlgren 2016; Caiani and Graziano 2016), taboo breaker 
(Caiani and Graziano 2016; Krämer 2014; Moffitt and Tormey 2014), and rationali‑
zation strategies.
The adjective used to connote the word ‘people’ refers to the semantic process by 
which the people gain political significance. In effect, the adjectives used to describe 
it allow for the politicization of the noun in a collective vision (Badiou et al. 2013). 
The adjective used to connote the people is also able to produce identification or 
describe the nature of the legitimacy of a political system, e.g. sovereign people. 
Thus, depending on the type of adjective, people can have many characterizations. 
It should be remarked, however, that by coding this variable, the purpose was not 
exclusively to classify adjectival patterns. Instead, it was used to analyse any item 
(adjectives, nouns, adverbs) helpful to describe better or connote the term ‘the peo‑
ple’ (e.g. the people of voters, the people of workers, etc.).
From this perspective, an analysis of the descriptive statistics was used to explain 
the general features in the research. Afterwards, the relationship between variables 
was tested to understand the possible associations between the adjective used to con‑
note ‘people’ and the leader, to understand how ‘people’ is contextualized in every 
single tweet. In this regard, correspondence analysis (De Luca and Ciaglia 2017; 
Greenacre 2017) was used to aid analysis of multinomial qualitative variables by 
reducing complexity through optimal scaling1 to identify the scores (i.e. the coor‑
dinates) of the modalities of the row variable (the leader) against a bi‑dimensional 
space based on the modalities of the column variables (the adjective).
1 The objective is to maximize the variance between alternative modalities, by attributing 0 to the mean 
of the medium profile and 1 to the variance of the medium profile.
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Results
Preliminary analysis
In general, the five leaders have used Twitter intensively during their political 
careers. Table 1 shows a snapshot of their profile on the last day of analysis. Jo Swin‑
son has been a Twitter user for the longest time, since 2008, while the most recent to 
use the platform is Boris Johnson, since 2015. Among the most followed is Corbyn 
with followers in excess of 2.3 million, Johnson and Farage reaching 1.4 million and 
Sturgeon just over one million. Swinson, despite her longevity as a Twitter user, has 
just 182,000 followers.
Table 2 includes information about the use of Twitter by the five leaders during 
the period under analysis. It shows the number of tweets and, above all, the percent‑
age containing the word ‘people’. Moreover, by analysing the ‘people’ tweets, the 
user’s behaviour is observed through the analysis of hashtag use, the average length 
of the tweet text, and the average number of retweets.
Looking at the data from 12 October to 16 December 2019, the political frontrun‑
ner Boris Johnson published 550 tweets, of which 10.4% contain a reference to the 
word ‘people’. In his ‘people’ tweets, Johnson used 21 hashtags, with an average 
tweet length of 179 characters. The average number of retweets was 906. Jeremy 
Corbyn, the Leader of the Labour Party, most commonly used the word ‘people’ 
(15.3%). Corbyn used 30 hashtags with an average per tweet of 214 characters. He 
was retweeted, on average, 4,121 times. Jo Swinson, although one of the most long‑
standing Twitter users, during the period was among the least active of the five lead‑
ers, and also the least retweeted, with an average of only 742 retweets. She used 22 
hashtags and an average of 198 characters per tweet. Her ‘people’ tweets reached 
12.8%. For Nicola Sturgeon, the First Minister of Scotland and the SNP leader, 
among the 212 tweets published she had the lowest proportion containing the word 
‘people’ (4.7%). Sturgeon used six hashtags and among the five leaders had the 
highest average number of characters: 253 of a maximum of 280 characters. She had 
a high retweet average of 2,456. Finally, Nigel Farage, Leader of the Brexit Party: of 
Table 2  ‘People’ in the leaders’ tweets (from 12 October 2019 to 16 December 2019)













Boris Johnson Conservative 550 57 10.4 21 179 906
Jeremy Cor‑
byn
Labour 756 116 15.3 30 214 4121
Jo Swinson Liberal demo‑
crats





212 10 4.7 6 253 2456
Nigel Farage Brexit 208 17 8.2 0 154 1985
Total – 1929 226 11.7 79 200 2042
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the 208 tweets published, 8.2% had a reference to ‘people’. None of the tweets con‑
sidered had a hashtag and they were shorter than those of the other leaders with an 
average of 154 characters. They had an average retweet rate of 1,985.
The contents, focus, and strategies of the campaigns
Several scholars have highlighted the importance of analysing the topic and issues 
covered on Twitter (Ausserhofer and Maireder 2013; Conway et  al. 2015; Davis 
et  al. 2016). An election campaign presents at least five different types of topic. 
First, issues related to the campaign, referring to the management or performance of 
the campaign in which the meeting and political events are narrated. Second, policy 
issues, referring to specific topics in which proposals to resolve problems are high‑
lighted. Third, political issues, focusing on politics, ideologies, and issues regarding 
the relationships among parties and institutions. Fourth, current affairs, referring to 
non‑political topics that are still current events (sport, events, news, etc.). Fifth, per‑
sonal issues, such as personal reflections or issues in politicians’ private lives.
The data analysed in this article covers only four of the five commonly used cat‑
egories. Indeed, among the 226 ‘people’ tweets analysed, those related to campaign 
issues—the management or performance of the campaign—reached 39.8% of the 
sample, followed by the policy issues (27.4%), political issues (21.7%), and current 
affairs (11.1%). None of the tweets analysed refers to the private life of politicians. 
This does not mean that they do not exist, but simply that in the sample selected 
based on ‘people’ there are no tweets associated with this category.
As regards the specific issue of each tweet, Table 3 shows the differences among 
the five leaders. Although the main topic has been campaign storytelling (21.4%), 
Brexit occupied a prominent role (18.9%).
Table 3  Issues in the ‘people tweets’ (%)
Percentages and totals are based on responses/items
Johnson Corbyn Swinson Sturgeon Farage Total
Brexit 26.7 6.8 66.7 8.3 20 18.9
Campaign (storytelling) 2.7 33.3 3.7 – 40 21.4
Economy & fiscal 17.3 14.3 – – 10 12.8
Environment – 4.1 3.7 8.3 – 2.8
Foreign countries 1.3 2.7 – 8.3 – 2.1
Improve country 8 8.2 3.7 8.3 10 7.8
Workforce – 7.5 – – – 3.9
NHS 13.3 12.2 – 16.7 – 10.7
Rights (e.g. minority, women, 
disabled, etc.)
– 7.5 18.5 50 – 7.8
Education (e.g. school system) 14.7 – – – – 3.9
Security 16 2.7 – – 10 6.4
Terrorism – 0.7 3.7 – 10 1.4
Total (N) 75 147 27 12 20 281
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Among the leaders, Swinson reached the highest value on Brexit (66.7%), see‑
ing the whole electoral campaign as related to the opportunity to establish a sec‑
ond referendum to allow the ‘Remainers’ another possibility. Johnson used Brexit 
(26.7%) to talk mainly about the British priorities in his programme: the NHS, 
security, and education/schools. Following this, Farage (20%), Sturgeon (8.3%), 
and finally Corbyn (6.8%) were the candidates with the lowest percentage of 
‘people’ tweets on Brexit. Corbyn mainly criticized Johnson’s deal.
The NHS issue was a key point of concern for Sturgeon (16.7%), Johnson 
(13.3%), and Corbyn (12.2%). Security was an issue dealt with by the most right‑
wing leaders, while the economy was central above all to the two main challeng‑
ers, Johnson and Corbyn, followed by Farage. The work issue was considered 
only by Corbyn, although in a small quantity (7.5%), and education only by John‑
son (14.7%). The general issue ‘improve country’ was covered by all the candi‑
dates except for Swinson, although for Sturgeon, naturally enough, it was about 
how to improve Scotland.
Another interesting aspect was the issue of rights, namely concerning minori‑
ties, disabled people, women, etc., which was the main issue for Sturgeon (50%). 
It was one of the most important topics for Swinson (18.5%) and partly also for 
Corbyn (7.5%). Minor issues, related to the candidates’ programmes or strategy, 
were, for example, for Farage the terrorism problem (10%), for Sturgeon Scot‑
land’s independence (see ‘improve country’, 8.3%), and, above all, for Corbyn 
the storytelling of his electoral campaign, focusing on his activists and supporters 
(33.3%).
From this perspective, the issues raised during the electoral campaign also 
become a reason to consider specific communication strategies using populist rheto‑
ric. Several scholars have shown that the key components of populism—anti‑elitism, 
general will, the opposition between pure people and the corrupt elite—have to be 
considered differently from populist styles (Bos et  al. 2010). Mainstream political 
parties more regularly use the performance style of populists than the more tradi‑
tional components of their rhetoric. The aim is to have an ordinary style (Mazzoleni 
et al. 2003), characterized by simplicity, and clarity (Taggart 2000). For this reason, 
it becomes fundamental for contemporary parties to organize all communicative 
strategies around a central (charismatic) leader (Weyland 2001).
These strategies refer to the communication technique implemented by parties 
and leaders and are divided into: emotional strategies that rely on common feel‑
ings (Bos et  al. 2011 2013; Mazzoleni et  al. 2003; Van Santen and Van Zoonen 
2010); instrumental strategies that exploit specific, generally current, events, sup‑
porting political positions using inductive reasoning (Krämer 2014); intimate strate‑
gies based on personification with episodes focusing on the private sphere (Stanyer 
2012); simplification strategies that face complex problems by offering simple solu‑
tions (Alvares and Dahlgren 2016; Caiani and Graziano 2016); taboo‑breaker strate‑
gies that shake up the norms of political correctness/politeness (Caiani and Graziano 
2016; Krämer 2014; Moffitt and Tormey 2014); and rationalization strategies around 
a specific concept based on common reason or scientific evidence. Our data shows 
(Table 4) that in the period under analysis the most used strategies were emotional 
(64.2%), followed by instrumental (26.5%), simplification (4.9%), rationalization 
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(3.1%), and intimate (1.3%). As for emotional strategies, Corbyn reached the highest 
value (81%), while for instrumental strategies Swinson reached 50%.
The adjective and the people
As stated in the previous section, the meaning of ‘people’ develops around several 
key aspects. Of these, one describes a socio‑historical body that lives in a specific 
territory, and another conveys a political collective that claims policies. In both 
cases, the problem of a body within borders has come to light, dividing who belongs 
to this body and who is not included. In this context, the analysis of the adjective 
used to politicize the neutral term ‘people’ becomes essential to understand borders’ 
characteristics.
A correspondence analysis was used to evaluate the association between the 
leader and the adjective that politicized the people. A preliminary analysis (Table 5) 
of the row‑normalized correspondences (44 degrees of freedom) shows a significant 
chi square2 (p < 0.000), whose value is 177.070. This value shows a strong associa‑
tion between the two variables’ modalities, allowing us to reject the hypothesis of 
independence between variables. Furthermore, the inertia for the two dimensions 
Table 4  Strategies in the ‘people tweets’ (%)
Johnson Corbyn Swinson Sturgeon Farage Total
Emotional 52.6 81.0 23.1 60.0 52.9 64.2
Instrumental 33.3 13.8 50.0 40.0 47.1 26.5
Simplification 14.0 2.6 – – – 4.9
Rationalization – 1.7 19.2 – – 3.1
Intimate – 0.9 7.7 – – 1.3
Taboo breaker – – – – – –
Total (N) 57 116 26 10 17 226
Table 5  Summary of adjective vs leader
a 44 degrees of freedom
Dimension Singular 
value










1 0.668 0.446 0.569 0.569 0.048 0.141
2 0.453 0.205 0.262 0.831 0.071
3 0.329 0.108 0.138 0.969
4 0.155 0.024 0.031 1.000
Total 0.783 177.070 0.000a 1.000 1.000
Who and what is their ‘people’? How British political leaders…
explains 83% of the model. Standard deviation is 0.048 and 0.071 for the two mod‑
els respectively. The correlation is low at 0.141.
On the other hand, an analysis of the columns reveals several interesting elements 
as regards the two dimensions (Table 6). The scores of the column modalities enable 
us to identify the two dimensions on a spatial map. Dimension 1 is positively char‑
acterized by the adjective ‘divisional’ (1.046) and negatively characterized by ‘Brit‑
ish’ (− 2.140). Dimension 2 displays positive values about ‘voting’ (2.412) and neg‑
atively associated with ‘elite’ (− 1.559). In short, Dimension 1 was defined as the 
social body that shares the same territory in a specific historical period, called the 
‘socio‑historical dimension’ and characterized by the opposition ‘divisional’ (+) vs 
‘British’ (−), while Dimension 2 was defined as the socio‑political group that claims 
and achieves political power through movements, parties, and their representatives, 
called the ‘socio‑political dimension’ and characterized by the opposition ‘voting’ 
(+) vs ‘elite’ (−).
Row principal normalization allowed row modalities (leader) to be interpreted 
against the two dimensions that have been drawn from the analysis. The next step 
was to calculate the angle formed by the two vectors originating in the point (0,0), 
and the directions determined by the coordinates of the row and column points, 
















Table 6  Overview column points
Rzow principal normalization
Adjective Mass Score in dimension Inertia Contribution of 
point to inertia 
of dimension
of dimension to inertia 
of point
1 2
1 2 1 2 Total
British 0.097 − 2.140 0.371 0.202 0.446 0.013 0.986 0.014 1.000
Elite 0.044 0.602 − 1.559 0.034 0.016 0.108 0.208 0.641 0.849
Divisional 0.053 1.046 0.578 0.070 0.058 0.018 0.371 0.052 0.423
Generic 0.385 0.208 − .580 0.048 0.017 0.130 0.155 0.553 0.708
Generational 0.058 0.413 0.671 0.011 0.010 0.026 0.413 0.502 0.915
Other 0.022 0.254 − 0.276 0.017 0.001 0.002 0.038 0.020 0.058
Our 0.018 − .830 − 0.326 0.008 0.012 0.002 0.643 0.046 0.688
Voting 0.102 0.894 2.412 0.170 0.081 0.592 0.213 0.713 0.926
Supporting 0.053 0.829 − 1.390 0.050 0.037 0.103 0.323 0.419 0.742
Weak 0.071 0.757 0.004 0.030 0.041 0.000 0.601 0.000 0.601
Wonderful 0.027 − .757 0.248 0.022 0.015 0.002 0.305 0.015 0.321
Working 0.071 − 1.939 0.286 0.120 0.266 0.006 0.985 0.010 0.995
Active total 1.000 .783 1.000 1.000
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where ‖r‖ is the length of the vector originating from (0,0) whose direction is 
defined by the coordinates of the row point r. It can be calculated using Pythagoras’ 
theorem. ‖c‖ is the length of the vector originating from (0,0), whose direction is 
defined by the coordinates of the column point c. It, too, can be calculated using 
Pythagoras’ theorem. Finally, r′c is the vector scalar product.
The calculation of the angles (and of the type of association with a certain adjec‑
tive) allows us to trace a profile of the five leaders (Table 7).2 Johnson displays a 
significant association with adjectives related to ‘British’, as well as with ‘wonder‑
ful’ and ‘working’. Conversely, he is weakly associated with ‘divisional’, ‘other’, 
and ‘weak’. Corbyn shows close ties with identity adjectives which emphasise the 
importance of belonging to a group rather than differences from other groups. In this 
respect, identity is treated in a positive manner. The adjectives are ‘other’ and ‘sup‑
porting’. The degree of association is weak with ‘British’, ‘wonderful’, and ‘work‑
ing’. For Swinson the analysis displays a close connection with such adjectives as 
‘generational’ and ‘voting’. Association is instead weak with ‘elite’, ‘generic’, and 
‘our’. Sturgeon has a strong association with adjectives such as ‘divisional’ and 








Table 7  Size of angles and associations between row and column modalities
a Strong association
b Weak association
Column modality Row modality
Johnson Corbyn Swinson Sturgeon Farage
British 2.06a 152.16b 111.42 133.49b 83.35
Elite 118.90 31.19 127.62b 105.55 37.62
Divisional 143.29b 66.62 29.81 7.74a 135.43
Generic 117.53 32.57 128.99b 106.92 36.24a
Generational 113.85 96.06 0.37a 21.71a 164.87b
Other 140.41b 9.69a 106.11 84.04 59.12
Our 29.21 120.88 142.69° 164.77b 52.07
Voting 102.56 107.35 10.92a 33.00 176.16b
Supporting 128.59 21.50a 117.93 95.86 47.31
Weak 171.92b 37.99 58.44 36.37 106.80
Wonderful 10.37a 160.47b 103.10 125.18 91.66
Working 0.63a 150.72b 112.85 134.93b 81.91
2 An acute angle identifies a positive association, a right angle a null association, an obtuse angle a nega‑
tive association.
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Farage shows a positive association with a generic use of the term ‘people’, and is 
weakly associated with ‘generational’ and ‘voting’.
The content analysis
The data allows us to introduce a possible explanation of the use of ‘people’ by the 
UK leaders during election time. Boris Johnson, who despite being the leader joined 
Twitter most recently in 2015, demonstrated that he could manage social media, 
especially after his appointment as Conservative leader in July 2019 when there 
was a spike in the number of both followers and political attacks. During his elec‑
toral campaign, he used three main communicative strategies on Twitter: emotional, 
instrumental, and simplification. This allowed him to manage the different situations 
both as party leader and as PM to discuss the Brexit deal and the British priorities 
in his programme, such as the NHS, security, and education. Numerous examples 
could be cited. One of the most interesting is in a tweet published on 11 November 
2019 where Johnson uses the word ‘people’ to talk about British priorities: ‘The 
British people have had enough delay & uncertainty. I want us to #GetBrexitDone 
and spend next year focusing on the issues that matter—tackling violent crime, 
investing in our NHS & schools, and strengthening our economy’.
Moreover, although Corbyn was closer to work issues in his debates, it is John‑
son who speaks about the ‘working people’. On 12 November 2019 he used the 
same language as in a previous tweet: ‘We can only invest in our great public ser‑
vices if we support the entrepreneurs, businesses and hardworking people who get 
up each day to build our strong economy’, and on 20 November 2019: ‘Today I’ve 
announced that under a majority Conservative government, we will cut taxes for 
millions of working people on low and middle incomes. I will cut taxes for working 
people’. Finally, for Johnson, the people became ‘beautiful’, ‘amazing’, and ‘pas‑
sionate’ in his tweets, especially when he talks about meetings where people were 
‘enthusiastic’ about his candidacy and his programme. On 22 November 2019, he 
writes: ‘We live in an incredible country. Everywhere I go, I meet people who are 
enthusiastic and passionate about this country’s future and what we can achieve. 
Let’s get Brexit done!’.
As regards Jeremy Corbyn, among the five candidates he is the most followed. 
Moreover, he was also the most active in Twitter use both for the highest number 
of tweets and for the highest percentage related to the word ‘people’. His commu‑
nicative strategy is mainly oriented to the emotional to rely on common feelings, 
which often coincides with an appeal to his supporters. However, Corbyn was the 
candidate with the lowest percentage of tweets on Brexit, used above all to criti‑
cize Johnson’s deal. It is particularly interesting to refer to a tweet published on 31 
October 2019, where he declares: ‘Boris Johnson has spent months promising we’d 
leave the EU today. The failure to do so is his and his alone. Labour will get Brexit 
sorted by giving the people the final say within six months with the choice of a cred‑
ible leave deal or remain. And we’ll carry out what you decide’. Thus, in Corbyn’s 
tweets, his people are made up of militants and supporters, as on 30 October 2019: 
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‘The General Election is here. We are a party of half a million people. We want you 
out there, door to door, talking to your neighbours about how we will transform our 
country’.
Nonetheless, in some cases, Corbyn used ‘the people’ in a generic way, without 
any adjective, such as on 7 December 2019: ‘The people telling you we can’t solve 
the climate crisis helped create it. The people telling you they won’t sell off our 
NHS can afford private healthcare. The people telling you we can’t scrap tuition 
fees went to university for free. They are not on your side’. In other cases, Corbyn 
embraces the people in their weakness by transforming himself into the paladin able 
to defend them. For example, on 1 November 2019, he attacks the more affluent peo‑
ple: ‘There are 150 billionaires in the UK while 14 million people live in poverty. In 
a fair society there would be no billionaires and no one would live in poverty’.
As for the Liberal Democrats’ leader, Jo Swinson, although she was the most 
long‑standing user of Twitter, since 2008, she had the lowest number of followers 
and tweets published during the period under analysis. However, after Corbyn she 
had the highest percentage of tweets about people. Her communicative strategies 
were mainly used in an instrumental way mixed up with the rationalization of main 
issues. Indeed, she used a specific event, like Brexit, in order to support her politi‑
cal position: the Brexit referendum was wrong, and the ‘voting’ people now needed 
a second referendum to allow the ‘remainers’, new and old, another possibility. On 
27 November 2019, she declared: ‘Brexit will damage the livelihoods of people, 
Fig. 1  Correspondence analysis of adjective and leader
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families, and communities across the whole United Kingdom. Every vote for @Lib‑
Dems is a vote to #StopBrexit. Together, we can build a #BrighterFuture. Join the 
fight to Stop Brexit now’. Further topics used by Swinson in a strategic way to attack 
her competitors were the generational issue, above all regarding young people, and 
the rights issue, concerning minorities, disabled people, women, etc. On 3 Decem‑
ber 2019 she published a tweet against Johnson using Trump’s visit: ‘Donald Trump 
is man who has boasted about sexually assaulting women, whose policies discrimi‑
nate against people from ethnic minorities and different religious backgrounds. A 
vote for Boris Johnson is a vote for Donald Trump’s politics. We must #StopBoris & 
#StopBrexit’ (Fig. 1).
As regards the leader of the Scottish National Party, Nicola Sturgeon, data, shown 
in the previous sections, highlights how, despite having a significant number of fol‑
lowers on Twitter, her activity on the platform was limited during the campaign. Of 
the five candidates, Sturgeon was the politician who used the word ‘people’ least of 
all. In the few cases analysed, Sturgeon focused mainly on ‘young’ people and gen‑
eral rights, for example, on 21 November 2019: ‘Great #GE19 visit with @AnneM‑
cLaughlin today to “Possibilities”, a fantastic organisation helping people with dis‑
abilities in many different ways. Thanks to all for the lovely welcome’. However, 
her emotional‑based communication strategy described people in a territorial way. 
While the other candidates endeavoured to maintain an imaginary and collective 
unit, Sturgeon mainly focused on the priorities of the Scottish people. On 8 Novem‑
ber 2019, she wrote ‘escape Brexit and put Scotland’s future into Scotland’s hands’. 
Thus, the type of contact between the leader and her people was the cornerstone 
around which the communication rotated, and the function of the SNP leader pri‑
marily aimed to create identification between the leadership and the people to whom 
she spoke. In this way, falling within the circle (of the people) became a crucial 
factor.
Sturgeon talked about her people in different ways. First, against Johnson on 3 
November 2019, when he rejected any request to hold a referendum on Scottish 
independence: ‘I wonder if at any point during #GE19, the media will subject this 
unsustainable and undemocratic position to any serious scrutiny? You know, instead 
of just asking if they will “allow” actually asking them to justify saying they will 
ignore the votes of the Scottish people’. Second, as First Minister of Scotland, on 
10 November 2019: ‘Today on behalf of the people of Scotland I will lay a wreath 
at the Stone of Remembrance in Edinburgh, in memory of all those who gave their 
lives in conflict. I will do so with the utmost gratitude and respect for the sacrifice 
and courage of our armed forces. #RemembranceDay’.
Finally, the leader of Brexit Party, Nigel Farage, conducted a subdued campaign, 
despite media premises of him as the potential main political actor. One of the rea‑
sons may have been the early decision that his party wouldn’t contest hundreds of 
Conservative Party‑held districts, boosting PM Johnson’s chances of re‑election. 
Indeed, before this decision, Johnson was the most attacked politician by Farage. 
For example, on 3 November 2019, he wrote: ‘From tomorrow, I will be going out 
to campaign across the length and breadth of this country. We will explain to people 
why Boris’ Brexit is a betrayal of the hopes of 17.4 m. That means I have no time to 
fight a seat myself, but I will support 600 other people who are’.
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Nevertheless, his Twitter campaign was built around two communicative strate‑
gies: emotional and instrumental. In particular, Farage focused on typical right‑wing 
issues related to security, introducing the terrorism topic after a terrorist knife attack 
in London at the end of November. On 30 November 2019, he declared: ‘People 
will be very angry that a convicted terrorist was on the streets of London after a 
very short sentence. For Labour to say the attack happened because of police cuts is 
nonsense, weak sentencing and soft policies from both parties are the cause of this 
outrage’.
Also, it must be highlighted that Farage’s people are mainly generic without 
a specific adjective to connote them. He had a ‘contract with the people’, as he 
declared on 9 December 2019, to give them ‘a genuine choice in this election’, as he 
wrote in a tweet on 5 November 2019. He directly appealed to the people, without 
borders, using them in an adversarial way to mark their distinction from the estab‑
lishment, e.g. when on 17 October he described the EU as an institution that ‘shows 
itself to be a thuggocracy—power without accountability’, or when on 27 November 
2019 he declared that Labour ‘have broken their promises to the people and they 
deserve to be beaten at the ballot box’.
Conclusion
This paper shows that to properly understand today’s people concept, an analysis 
of its meaning is required through a critical evaluation of how the word ‘people’ 
is used by leaders. More specifically, this contributes an empirical assessment of 
how, in a controversial period of UK political history, the foremost party leaders 
can appeal to their people, looking at them as a unified entity with legitimate power 
(Espejo 2011); a social body; and a socio‑political group (Espejo 2017; Smith 2003; 
Urbinati 2019). Furthermore, depending on how the people are connoted through 
specific adjectives, the paper identified and empirically discussed how the people 
concept can attract different meanings and a political connotation (Badiou et  al. 
2013).
Indeed, although several scholars describe it as an ‘empty signifier’ (Laclau 
2005) due to its objective flexibility, this study, following other approaches (Mudde 
2004; Taggart 2000, 2004), considers ‘the people’ as not completely empty. This 
is due to the socio‑cultural soul of the context, for example, or the construction of 
content by leaders based on the self‑perception of features of target communities 
which share common ideals. Thus, while populism is considered here as a thin ide‑
ology, the paper also aims to understand its borders. As regards the results, the paper 
highlights three principal attitudes related to the connotation of ‘the people’ by the 
UK leaders. First, Johnson communicated with every (British) person, regardless of 
their political opinions, in order to have a single people to love, look after, and pro‑
tect, and from whom he asked for legitimacy throughout the election campaign. The 
frontrunner institutionalized himself as having a paternalistic attitude, safeguarding 
and representing the real interests of his people. Simplistically, he created a vertical, 
direct and immediate relationship with the British people when it came close to poll‑
ing day.
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Second, the group of leaders represented by Corbyn, Swinson, and Sturgeon was 
characterized by an identity‑based pattern of communication: supporters, ‘remain‑
ers’, and Scottish. This attitude emphasizes what unifies the people within a specific 
circle rather than what differentiates them from those outside. This type of attitude 
describes the people as a strong, cohesive group. For example, Corbyn’s campaign 
has been regarded as the part of politics that tries to represent everything by con‑
tinually calling on its militants and supporters to remain united. Third, the people 
without borders of Farage was a communication strategy aimed at emphasizing the 
differences between the pure people and the corrupt elites. This attitude also uses 
the identity dimension but in a distinctive way to claim differences from those who 
are not included in that circle.
Thus, the results highlight three key attitudes related to the connotation of ‘peo‑
ple’. The first considers a direct and immediate relationship between a leader and 
the whole people. The second is a calling to a specific people, described as a strong 
and cohesive community, which share the same ideals. The third is a set of people 
without borders, held together by cultural/moral values, contraposing pure people 
and the corrupt elite.
In this instance, in the first attitude, there are no clear elements of populism. This 
attitude was influenced also by the Conservatives’ approach, which, as argued by 
several scholars, was built around a tight and controlled strategy able to avoid pos‑
sible risks (Power et al. 2020). As regards the second attitude, it needs to consider 
separately Swinson’s approach, where is difficult to assume that we are facing the 
populist phenomenon. The inability of the Liberal Democrats to burst through as a 
real centrist third party (Flinders 2020) can be blamed on poor campaign strategy, 
although there was a new core vote based on her people, the Remainers, and on the 
stronger polarization of public opinion for and against Johnson (Sloman 2020).
In two other leaders, the people are evident in different aspects, both relevant in 
understanding the populism of the left. The calling of the leaders to a self‑percep‑
tion of targeted communities is relevant in Corbyn and Sturgeon’s ‘people’. This 
also shows the fragility/thinness of the populist idea. Indeed, as argued by March 
(2017), in particular as regards the SNP, British left populists strongly overlap with 
the underlying ideology. This allows understanding of how in the last electoral cam‑
paign the host ideology was more important than the populism idea in explaining 
the essence of the phenomenon highlighted in this study’s outcomes.
The Labour Party admittedly seems to be more contradictory. The key factor 
in this established party is the role of its leadership in recent years. Several schol‑
ars argue that Corbynism, as an extremely personalistic political leadership, insti‑
gated the party’s leftward change, above all the view that Labour’s members had 
to be considered as ‘the people’ (Watts and Bale 2019). Although other important 
research suggests that Labour’s populist transformation by Corbyn has different 
doubtful aspects, including the Bennite traditionalism that seems more determinant 
(March 2017), the analysis shown in this paper seems to confirm Watts and Bale’s 
findings. The key core around which Corbyn’s galaxy orbits is ‘the people’ as a 
group of members. They are his legitimation, the heartland focused on past ideals 
against the (internal and external) elite conspiracy where the leader becomes the 
only possibility of a democratic solution.
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Finally, the third attitude is represented by Farage’s ‘people’. This populist anti‐
EU campaigner has used Twitter since the beginning in an effective way. Several 
scholars show how his communication style appears both down‐to‐earth and emo‑
tive using provocations based on ‘common sense’ (Breeze 2020). Nigel Farage and 
others in general right‑wing populism appropriate the voice of the people through 
a simplistic set of messages (Freeden 2017). His people are mainly generic people 
without a clear specification able to connote them, used in the rhetorical contraposi‑
tion that differentiates themselves, and their leader, obviously, from the establish‑
ment. Given this type of scenario, it is certainly not surprising that Farage’s ‘people’ 
was found to be closely associated with Mudde’s dichotomy (2004).
Thus, this first analysis of ‘people’ provides a renewed understanding of the 
concept, above all under a populist perspective which emphasizes its thinness as 
an ideology. After all, populism can appear as ‘self‑limiting’ and ‘episodic’ (Tag‑
gart 2000), showing a karstic trend. It runs underground, appearing periodically 
with explicit reference to particularly regrettable events, anchoring itself to a host as 
much as possible in a symbiotic relationship—parasitism, mutualism, commensal‑
ism, or whatever it is—to disappear until its next re‑emergence.
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